Development Patterns and the Recreation Value of Amenities by Kovacs, Kent F. & Larson, Douglas M.
Development Patterns and the Recreation Value
of Amenities
By Kent F. Kovacs and Douglas M. Larson
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
University of California, Davis
kovacs@primal.ucdavis.edu
Selected Paper prepared for presentation at the AAEA
Annual Meeting, Providence, Rhode Island, July 24-27, 2005
Copyright 2005 by Kent Kovacs. All rights reserved. Readers may make
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any
means, provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.1 Introduction
Public open space o®ers many bene¯ts to the residents of cities including
recreational opportunities, environmental and ecosystem bene¯ts, and visual
amenities. Evidence that the bene¯ts of open space are substantial is clear
from the support the public has given to ballot measures to conserve, create,
and rehabilitate open space. In 2003 and 2002, ballot measures generated
$1.8 billion and $10 billion respectively for local and state land conserva-
tion bringing the full tally of funds since 2000 to $16.8 billion (Land Trust
Alliance, 2004).
A substantial proportion of the bene¯ts from public open space are from
recreation since an enormous number of people in the United States engage
in basic outdoor recreation. Eighty-three percent of the 250 million people
in the United States do walking for pleasure, 74% have family gatherings,
54% do picnicking, 52% do sightseeing, and 45% go wildlife viewing. Further,
participation in these activities is growing. In the last nine years, 40 million
more people began walking for pleasure, family gathering grew by 36 million,
picnicking grew by 20 million, and sightseeing grew by 24 million (National
Survey on Recreation and the Environment, 2003).
Unfortunately, there is an increasing level of public open space loss each
year. In the past 20 years, thirty-four million acres were converted to devel-
oped uses - an area roughly the size of Illinois. From 1997 to 2001, forty-six
percent of the converted land was forested, twenty percent was cropland,
and sixteen percent was pastureland (U.S. Department of Agriculture). The
signi¯cant bene¯ts that the public receives from open space coupled with
the steady demise of public open space around urban areas is likely to make
issues about open space an increasingly more important topic for environ-
mental policy and research.
Most commonly, open space refers to either public or private land that is
undeveloped. However, di®erent demographics of people have di®erent views
of the de¯nition of open space. While rural residents only view farmland as
open space if the land is publicly accessible, farmers view all farmland as
open space providing wildlife habitat and clean air (ARE Update, May/June
2003). Open space in my research is public open space since the public is
assumed able to do recreation on the land. There is no debate among the
di®erent demographic groups that public open space is open space.
Economists have examined the in°uence of open space on urban areas
since the late 1970s. Economic theory models examining open space largely
1fall into two categories. The ¯rst category is the emphasis taken in this paper.
This category uses the monocentric city model to examine the interaction
between urban spatial structure and open space (Polinsky and Shavell 1976;
Yang and Fujita 1983; Fujita 1989; Yang 1990; Lee and Fujita 1997; Wu and
Plantinga 2003). These studies put open space of di®erent sizes and shapes
into a city with an in°uential Central Business District (CBD) to see how
land rents, lot sizes, and the area of the city change. The second category
examines competition among the municipalities in the provision of public
goods, such as open space, to maximize the utility of its residents (Tiebout
1956; Correll, Lillydahl et al. 1978; Wile 1978; Marshall 2004). Residents
move between municipalities depending on their preference for either a larger
house or more open space.
A signi¯cant strand of empirical research on open space examines the
in°uence of open space on housing prices. The hedonic property price method
has been applied to the housing market to learn the value of proximity to
urban parks and forests (Weicher and Zerbst February 1973; Tyrvainen and
Miettinen March 2000), lakes and rivers (Lansford and Jones July 1995;
Leggett and Bockstael March 2000), and urban wetlands (Doss and Ta®
1996; Mahan, Polasky et al. 2000). The marginal willingness to pay to have
more of or live closer to these di®erent types of open space is identi¯ed.
Recently stated preference techniques, such as contingent valuation and
conjoint analysis, have been used to learn about the interactions between
open space, housing values, and residential development (Johnston, Swallow
et al. 2002; Roe, Irwin et al. 2004). Further, there is a trend towards
analyzing the general equilibrium relationships determining the urban spatial
structure of a city. By modeling housing prices, development densities and
house sizes as a system, both estimates and inferences are improved (Wu,
Adams et al. 2004).
2 Model
The basic model for investigating the in°uence of amenities, including the
recreation value of those amenities, on residential development and density
is examined in this chapter. Extensions to the basic model are presented at
the end of the chapter.
In the Alonso-Muth-Mills tradition, the urban area containing the resi-
dential developments of interest has a single central business district (CBD)
2which households commute to for employment. The households have identi-
cal incomes and preferences, and the commuting cost depends on the distance
between the residence and the CBD. Land developers utilize identical con-
stant returns to scale technology for residential development. The market for
residential development is perfectly competitive, and the development pro¯ts
are zero.
Households choose a residential location from preferences de¯ned over
home size, recreation at the amenities, the ambient level of the amenities,
and a non-housing (numeraire) good with the commuting cost represented in
the budget constraint. Land developers choose the location, home size, and
density of development to maximize pro¯ts. The interaction of the prefer-
ences of households for housing and the pro¯t motives of the land developers
results in a spatial market equilibrium of housing prices, which equates the
demand for and supply of housing at each location.
The spatial market equilibrium is in°uenced by the choice of whether to
model a city as open or closed. An open city model assumes that households
migrate between cities to maintain an exogenous level of utility. The closed
city model assumes that the population of the households is ¯xed and the
utility of the households °uctuate in response to changes in the framework
of the city.
The choice of an open or closed city model hinges on whether the urban
model is meant to represent a short or long run spatial market equilibrium.
The closed city model is better suited for short run analysis since the popu-
lation of a city is largely ¯xed in the short run while the open city model is
better suited for the long run analysis where households have had the chance
to migrate across cities. Since the in°uence of policies on both the short and
long run equilibriums of a city is of interest, both the closed and open city
models are examined.
2.1 The household location decision
The landscape of the model is represented by the Cartesian plane (u;v) 2 R2,
and the CBD is represented by a single point located at the origin (0,0). The
u-axis is the west-east direction in miles, and the v-axis is the south-north
direction in miles. All of the landscape other than the origin is available for
residential development.
The population of households has identical income and preferences. A
household located at the residential site (u;v) has a commuting distance in
3miles to the CBD of x(u;v) =
p
u2 + v2. The distance of most commutes
is longer than the shortest distance between a residential site and the CBD.
However, the common use of highways in urban areas for commuting makes
the assumption not a bad approximation.
Residential sites are di®erentiated by their proximity to the amenities.
Heterogeneity in the ambient level of amenities is represented by the dis-
tribution function a((u;v);rd) de¯ned over the landscape. The proximity
and physical size, represented by the radius rd, of the circular amenities
near the residential site (u;v) in°uences the magnitude of a((u;v);rd). The
magnitude of a((u;v);rd) asymptotically approaches the base value of 1 for
residential sites su±ciently far away from all of the amenities. Examples of
how the proximity of an amenity to a residential site in°uences the ambient
level of amenities at the site include improvements in views of the amenities
from the site and cleaner air at the site.
Heterogeneity in the cost of a recreation trip over the landscape is rep-
resented in the household budget constraint by k(u;v). The proximity of
the amenity closest to the residential site (u;v) in°uences the magnitude of
k(u;v) since trips require travel costs. Since each amenity is identical by
assumption, the proximity of amenities other than the amenity closest to the
residential site (u;v) does not in°uence the magnitude of k(u;v).
The magnitude of k(u;v) does not rise proportionally with distance from
an amenity since the city streets usually traversed to reach an amenity often
contain additional barriers to travel. For instance, a household twice the
distance away from an amenity incurs more than twice the travel cost for
a recreation trip. Households at residential sites directly adjacent to an
amenity have zero travel cost for a recreation trip, but there is an admission
fee, af, for access to the amenity.
Each household takes the price per square foot of residential space, p(u;v),
the commuting distance in miles, x(u;v), the ambient level of amenities,
a(u;v), and the cost of a recreation trip, k(u;v), as given. Accordingly, by
selecting the residential site (u;v), the household is simultaneously choosing
a housing price, a commuting distance, an ambient level of amenities, and a
cost of a recreation trip.
2.1.1 Positive number of recreation trips
Each household chooses among residential space q, recreation trips T, resi-
dential site (u;v), and a numeraire \all other consumption" good g to max-
4imize utility U(q;T;g;a((u;v);rd)). The budget constraint of the household
is p(u;v)q + k(u;v)T + g + tx(u;v) = y, where y is the gross household in-
come, and t is the round-trip commuting cost per mile. The utility function
speci¯cation chosen is Stone-Geary since the demand for recreation trips is






where 0 < ® < 1; 0 < ¯ < 1;and ° > 0:
The ¯rst order conditions for the utility maximization problem specify
the optimal choices of residential space, recreation trips, and the numeraire













¤(u;v) = (y ¡ tx(u;v) + k(u;v))(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯) (4)
Competition for housing bids up the prices of housing in desirable loca-
tions. In the closed city, utility adjusts to changes in the framework of the
city. However, in equilibrium, household utility V is identical across house-
holds. Households far away from the CBD have longer commutes but pay
less for housing than households closer to the CBD. In the open city, the
equilibrium utility is exogenous from the standpoint of a single city since
migration equalizes utility V across cities.
Substituting (2)-(4) into the utility function (1) and setting utility equal
to V yields the bid price of housing for the locations where households take
a positive number of recreation trips:
p¤(u;v) =
"








The bid price equation (5) reveals the in°uence of amenities on the house-
hold's maximum willingness to pay for housing at location (u;v). The het-
erogeneity in the ambient level of amenities across the landscape, represented
5by a((u;v);rd)°, directly in°uences the bid price of housing. If the ambient
level of amenities is high enough, households may be willing to pay more for
housing close to an amenity than housing close to the CBD.
The proportion of household income spent after commuting costs on recre-
ation, ¯, and the cost per trip of recreation, k(u;v), operate together to in-
°uence the bid price of housing. If there is spatial variation in k(u;v), then
the cost per trip of recreation produces spatial variation in the bid price of
housing. If there is no spatial variation in the cost per trip, k(u;v) = k, then
all households bene¯t(lose) equally from a fall(rise) in the cost per trip of
recreation, and no spatial variation is produced from the recreation costs on
the bid price of housing.
The magnitude of the proportion of household spending on recreation,
i.e ¯, in°uences the sensitivity of housing prices to spatial variation in the
cost per trip of recreation. For instance, if recreation is a large proportion of
household spending, i.e. high ¯, then even slight spatial variation in the cost
per trip of recreation produces signi¯cant spatial variation in the bid price of
housing. Naturally, changes in recreation costs have a stronger in°uence on
housing prices if recreation is a large component of household spending. The
issues surrounding the in°uence of amenities on housing prices are analyzed
in more detail later in the chapter.
2.1.2 Zero recreation trips
For households at a distance far enough away from every amenity, zero recre-
ation trips to any amenity is optimal. As the distance from an amenity in-
creases, the travel cost component of the cost per trip rises until the choke
price of recreation trips is reached. Setting (3) equal to zero and rearranging
yields the choke price of recreation trips, ^ k(u;v) = ¯(y ¡ tx(u;v) + k(u;v)).
The proportion of household spending on recreation de¯nes the choke price.
A higher proportion of household spending on recreation implies households
at greater distances from an amenity will still take recreation trips.
If the cost per trip exceeds ^ k(u;v), then no recreation trips are taken
by the household, and the utility maximization problem of the household
changes. Now, the household maximizes U(q;g;a((u;v);rd)) = a((u;v);rd)°q®g1¡®¡¯
subject to p(u;v)q + g + tx(u;v) = y.
From the ¯rst order conditions of the new utility maximization problem
and from setting utility equal to V , the bid price of housing for the locations












The cost of a recreation trip k(u;v) no longer in°uences the bid price of
housing equation (6). However, the preference for recreation still in°uences
the bid price of housing through the parameter ¯. The ambient level of
amenities potentially still in°uences the bid price of housing although the
in°uence is likely non-existent since the ambient level of amenities disappears
very quickly with distance from an amenity.
2.2 The residential development decision
The model of the supply side of residential development comes from Wu
and Plantinga (2003). Residential developers choose the location (u;v) and
density s (total residential space per acre) of development to maximize pro¯ts
per acre ¼((u;v);s). The pro¯t per acre ¼((u;v);s) = p(u;v)s ¡ c((u;v);s),
where p(u;v) is the price of residential space and c((u;v);s) = r(u;v) + c(s)
are total costs that include the price per acre of land r(u;v) and the building
costs c(s). The building costs c(s) = c0 +s± include laying the foundation c0
and the construction s±, with ± > 1.





Equation (7) shows that the density of housing at (u;v) increases with the
price of residential space at (u;v). p¤¤(u;v) is the minimum selling price for
residential space at (u;v). Combining together equation (7) with the knowl-
edge that pro¯ts must be zero in competitive market equilibrium obtains the













Equation (8) shows that the price of land at (u;v) increases with the price
of residential space at (u;v).
72.3 Conditions of spatial market equilibrium
Five conditions combining the household location decision and residential
development decision characterize the spatial market equilibrium. The ¯rst
equilibrium condition is that housing prices are bid up until no household
has the incentive to move. This condition is satis¯ed when housing prices
are represented by (5) since the household's bid function is the maximum
willingness to pay for housing.
The second equilibrium condition is that at each location the price house-
holds are willing to pay for housing equals the price developers are willing
to accept for housing. This second condition is satis¯ed when p¤(u;v) =
p¤¤(u;v). The third equilibrium condition is that land price are bid up until
the pro¯ts are zero everywhere and developers are indi®erent to the location
of development. The third condition is satis¯ed when land prices are repre-
sented by (8) since the developer's bid function is the maximum willing to
pay for land.
The fourth equilibrium condition is that all households are accommodated
such that the total supply of housing equals the total demand of housing. The
household density n(u;v) (households per acre) is the development density
(residential space per acre) divided by the housing demand per household
(residential space per household). Since land is developed if the developer's
bid price for land exceeds the agricultural rent rag, the developed area is the






du dv = N; (9)
determines the equilibrium utility of the households V in the closed city
model or the total number of households N in the open city model. The 640
is the conversion factor from acres to square miles since household density is
per acre but u and v are measured in miles.
The ¯fth equilibrium condition is that the city boundary is the set of
locations where the land price equals the agricultural rent, f(u;v)jr¤(u;v) =
ragg.
The mechanisms of the model are illustrated here brie°y through com-
parative statics. First, suppose an open city model. A rise in income, a fall in
commuting costs, or a fall in recreation costs cause in-migration and increases
in housing and land prices throughout the city. To convince yourself, note
from (5) and (8) that @p¤=@y > 0, @p¤=@t < 0, @r¤=@y > 0, and @r¤=@t < 0
8for any (u;v), and @p¤=@k < 0 and @r¤=@k < 0 for all (u;v) where there is
a positive number of recreation trips. Wherever housing prices increase, (2)
and (7) illustrate that the demand for residential space q falls and the density
of development s rises. The rise in land prices increases the developed area
de¯ned by f(u;v)jr¤(u;v) ¸ ragg. Bringing these results together indicates
that the left-hand side of (9) increases, and the number of households N
must rise to restore equilibrium.
Now, suppose a closed city model. Since the level of utility readjusts
in response to changes in the parameters, the mechanics of the closed city
version of the model are a good deal more complex. The comparative statics
were ¯rst fully laid out by William Wheaton (1974). A rise in income, a fall
in commuting costs, or a fall in the recreation costs (for the special case of
no spatial variation in the recreation costs, i.e. k(u;v) = k) cause the utility
level to rise, the developed area to increase, and the housing and land price
gradients to °atten.
Following the logic from the open city model derivation, to roughly illus-
trate the derivation by Wheaton of the closed city model, a rise in income,
a fall in commuting costs, or a fall in recreation costs make housing and
land prices rise, the demand for residential space fall, the density of devel-
opment rise, and the developed area expand. The di®erence from the open
city model is that the number of households is ¯xed, and the utility level
imbedded within the left-hand side of (9) adjusts to restore equilibrium.
A rise of the utility level simultaneously increases the demand for resi-
dential space and lowers the density of development in order to equate the
left-hand side of (9) to N. Note from (5) that the rise in the utility level
causes housing and land prices to fall faster near the city center than at the
city boundary since the numerator of (5) is larger near the city center. The
result is that the housing and land price gradients °atten. The fall in land
prices at the city boundary in the utility adjustment process suggests that
the developed area expands less than in open city model.
The comparative statics for a fall in the recreation costs, where there is
spatial variation in the recreation costs, for the closed city case are not fully
worked out. The areas of the city where recreation costs are important are
likely to exhibit a greater expansion in the developed area and °atter housing
and land price gradients. The areas of the city where recreation costs have
no importance are likely to exhibit a contraction in developed area and a
steepening of housing and land price gradients. However, these predictions
are based upon economic intuition rather than analytical derivation, and the
9numerical simulations later in this chapter better illustrate the in°uence of
recreation costs on the urban spatial structure.
2.4 Amenities, recreation, and property values in an
open city { A general formulation
The speci¯cation of a utility function's functional form is necessary for the
simulations, but further insights into the in°uence of amenities and recreation
on urban spatial structure are possible with a fully general utility function.
By substituting the optimal choices of residential space, recreation trips,
and the numeraire good into the direct utility function U, the indirect utility
function V expressed as a function of the price of residential space, income net
of transportation costs, amenities, and the cost of recreation at that location
is formed. In an open city, the common level of utility V is exogenous since
households are free to migrate at no cost between cities.
V = V (p(u;v);y ¡ tx(u;v);a(u;v);k(u;v)): (10)
Utility is equalized because the price of a square foot of housing adjusts
across locations to leave households equally well o®. The higher the attrac-
tiveness of a location the higher the price of a square foot of housing at that
location to equalize utility. The attractiveness of a location depends on its
proximity to the CBD and other amenities. Di®erentiating (10) with respect















where the subscripts denote partial derivatives.
V1 < 0; since, ceteris paribus, an increase in the price of a
square foot of housing decreases utility;
V2 > 0; since, ceteris paribus, an increase in income net
commuting costs increases utility;
V3 > 0; since, ceteris paribus, an increase in amenities in-
crease utility;
V4 < 0; since, ceteris paribus, an increase in the cost of
recreation decreases utility.
The housing price gradient may be either upward or downward sloping.
The ¯rst term, which is negative since x0 > 0, shows the rate at which
10the housing price gradient slopes downward, as one moves further from the
CBD, to keep housing attractive enough to compensate for the increase in
commuting costs. The second term, which is the same sign as a0, expresses
the change in amenities and their e®ect on utility. The higher that the
marginal utility of amenities, V3, is the more that housing prices adjust to a
change in the level of amenities. A signi¯cantly large change in a0 may result
in an upward sloping housing price gradient over some range.
The third term, which is the opposite sign of k0, expresses the change
in the recreation costs and their e®ect on utility. The higher the marginal
utility of recreation, V4, is the more that housing prices adjust to a change
in the level of recreation costs. Since amenities fall and the recreation costs
rise with distance from an amenity, the sign of a0 and k0 are opposite each
other. A moderate change in a0 and k0 may result in a housing price gradient
with a positive slope over some range since the second and third terms of
(11) complement each other.
The condition to observe an upward sloping housing price gradient while
moving further away from the CBD is,
V3 a
0 + V4 k
0 > V2 tx
0: (12)
Equation (12) states that the housing price gradient rises if a movement
away from the CBD results in a greater utility gain from improved amenities
and lower recreation costs than the loss of utility from higher commuting
costs.









From (11) a fall in recreation costs everywhere shifts up the housing price
gradient. However, (13) illustrates that the demand for housing could remain
unchanged or even rise if the fall in recreation costs outweighs the rise in the
price of residential space. However, the separability of utility used for the
simulations, since the functional form is Stone-Geary, ensures that a fall in
recreation costs results in a decline in the demand for housing.
Equation (11) illustrates that in an open city the price of housing at any
location depends only on the level of amenities and the costs of recreation
11at that location. The reason is that in an open city each location yields the
¯xed level of utility V . Since the level of amenities and recreation costs at
other locations do not in°uence the level of utility, the price of housing at a
particular location is only in°uenced by the level of amenities and recreation
costs at that location. Since the supply of housing of a single city is tiny
in comparison to the supply of housing available across all cities, a change
in the supply of housing at other locations of a city brought about by a
change in the level of amenities or the recreation costs does not in°uence the
price of housing at locations where no change in the level of amenities or the
recreation costs occurred.
If su±cient assumptions are made about preferences, information about
the preferences for amenities and recreation may be obtained from the equi-
librium bid price for housing. Consider the case of the Stone-Geary utility
















where C = ®®¯¯(1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)1¡®¡¯. To see that these parameters can be
identi¯ed by standard estimation techniques, take natural logs to convert
(14) into a linear relationship,
p
¤
uv = m0 + m1yuv + m2auv + m3kuv; (15)
where
puv = log p(u;v); yuv = log ( y¡tx(u;v)+k(u;v));
auv = log a(u;v); kuv = log k(u;v);
m0 = (1=®) log (C=V ); m1 = 1=®;
m2 = °=®; m3 = ¡¯=®:
Equation (15) expresses the determinants of the equilibrium bid price of
housing in the form of a regression equation. The coe±cients estimates of
m1;m2; and m3 together allow for identi¯cation of ®;°; and ¯.
122.5 Amenities, recreation, and property values in a
closed city { A general formulation
In a closed city, the population is ¯xed, and the common level of utility V
is endogenous since households are no longer able to migrate between cities.
The equilibrium bid price condition similar to (10) is,
V = V (p(u;v);y ¡ tx(u;v);a(u;v);k(u;v)): (16)
A fall in recreation costs may lead to either an increase or decrease in V .
A decrease in V would occur if a fall in recreation costs made the demand for
housing increase enough (despite the rise in housing prices) that residential
density declines throughout the city. A possible explanation is that recreation
and housing are complements. However, the expectation is that a fall in
recreation costs would increase V since a rise in housing prices typically
increases residential density. A su±cient condition to have V increase is that
utility is separable. The Stone-Geary speci¯cation of utility used for the
simulations is a separable form of utility. Thus, for the simulations of the
closed city, a fall in recreation costs results in an increase of V . Unlike the
open city case, the price of housing at (u;v) is in°uenced by a change in the
recreation costs anywhere in the city, through their e®ect on V .
Suppose two scenarios for a change in recreation costs. The ¯rst sce-
nario has recreation costs fall everywhere except at (u;v). The second has
recreation costs fall everywhere, including at (u;v). For both scenarios, the
resulting change in housing prices at (u;v) is examined.
A fall in recreation costs everywhere except at (u;v) increases V causing
p(u;v) to fall. All locations except (u;v) have become relatively more at-
tractive. Since households are drawn away from (u;v), p(u;v) must fall to
restore equilibrium. The fall in p(u;v) because of the rise in V is the indi-
rect e®ect of recreation costs on p(u;v). Suppose that recreation costs fall
at (u;v) too. The rise in p(u;v) that results is the direct e®ect of recreation
costs on p(u;v).
A fall in recreation cost everywhere, including at (u;v), is represented
through a shift parameter ½ such that k½ = @k((u;v);½)=@½ < 0, for all (u;v).
Since utility is endogenous in a closed city, V is dependent on recreation costs
throughout the city, and is thus a function of ½. For the Stone-Geary form
of utility, a downward shift in recreation costs raises V , i.e. V ½ > 0. The
13in°uence of a downward shift in recreation costs on the bid price for housing
is illustrated by di®erentiating (15) with respect to ½. The result is that
@p(u;v)=@½ > 0 if "y½k½ ¡ ¯"k½ > "
V ½ ; (17)
















A downward shift in recreation costs raises the bid price for housing if
the elasticity of recreation costs with respect to ½ (weighted by ¯) exceeds
the elasticity of utility with respect to ½. The elasticity of net income with
respect to ½ is close to zero since recreation costs are a tiny share of net in-
come. The sensitivity of recreation costs to ½, that is "k½, and the importance
of recreation ¯ embody together the direct e®ect of recreation costs on hous-
ing prices. The sensitivity of the common level of utility to ½, that is "
V ½,
embodies the indirect e®ect of recreation costs on housing prices. At each
(u;v), these e®ects work in opposite directions to determine how housing bid
prices change in response to an increase in ½.
Less information about the preferences for amenities and recreation is
available from the equilibrium bid price of housing if a closed city is assumed.
There is an identi¯cation problem since net income, amenities, and recreation
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auv = log a(u;v); kuv = log k(u;v);
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2 = °=®; m
0
3 = ¡¯=®:
Since V is endogenous, the term m
0
0 is no longer a constant. Any incorrect
measurement of m
0
0 generates bias in the coe±cient estimates since the error







direct e®ects of net income, amenities, and recreation costs on housing bid
prices, the indirect e®ect through m
0







3 prevent the identi¯cation of ®;°; and ¯.
14There is no way to know from standard real estate data if the city is closed
or open. The cost of mobility between cities is the best measure of the degree
of openness of a city. Unfortunately, since the cost of mobility varies across
households, only those unobservables about the households could determine
if the data re°ect a closed or open city.
3 Amenities, recreation, and property values
in a closed city { Simulations
Simulations of the spatial city model with amenities enable an examination
of the e®ect of open space policies on urban spatial structure. A government
agency purchases land for public open space. The land is immediately per-
ceived by the public as an amenity. Since the residents of the city have public
access to the open space, one principal type of bene¯t to the households from
the open space is recreation. Another principal type of bene¯t is ambient
amenities in the form of pleasant views of the open space or cleaner air from
the vegetation at the open space. The agency is able to change the quality
of the open space in ways that in°uence particular types of bene¯ts (e.g.,
recreation) but not others (e.g., the views of the open space).
The comparison of spatial equilibria for a city with no open space and for
cities with open spaces in di®erent locations identi¯es how di®erent spatial
con¯gurations of open space in°uence recreation and urban spatial structure.
Two types of spatial con¯gurations of open space are explored. In the ¯rst
type, the land acquired for public open spaces is at di®erent proximities to
each other. The ¯rst type of open space locations enable an investigation
of the importance public open space concentration. In the second type, the
land acquired for public open spaces is at di®erent proximities to the CBD.
In this case, the importance of public open spaces outside the city boundary
for development density and recreation is examined. Both types of spatial
con¯gurations of open space are simulated with and without the presence
of ambient amenities. The comparison of the spatial equilibria for cities
with and without ambient amenities identi¯es how recreation bene¯ts versus
ambient amenity bene¯ts in°uence recreation and urban spatial structure.
Table 1 lists the parameter values used in the simulations. Since the spec-
i¯cation of household utility and the developer's cost function are largely for
analytical convenience, the parameter values are to a certain extent arbi-
15trarily chosen to help illustrate the in°uence of public open spaces on urban
spatial structure and recreation. However, most of the parameter values
are consistent with empirical evidence from the US. Since households spend
about 30-35% of income on housing and 20-25% of income on commuting,
setting ® = 0:4 is appropriate since households spend about 40% of income
after commuting costs on housing. The intra-city travel cost per mile for
recreation trips is consistent with the annual commuting cost per mile. The
di®erence between the travel costs is because travel for commuting is often
along freeways while intra-city travel is often along streets with tra±c lights.
The parameter value units are based upon the assumption that each point
(u;v) on the landscape is an acre of land.
In the spatial equilibrium of a city with no public open space, the city is
circular and all the land within the city boundary is developed. There are
no recreation opportunities for households, and the ambient amenities are
uniformly distributed across the city and normalized to one (i.e., a(u;v) = 1).
The city is circular since land prices depend only on the distance to the CBD.
In panel (a) of Figure 1, the city with no public open space is shown. For
all the ¯gures, the contours represent the level of the land prices within
the city. Recall that housing and land prices are directly related to each
other through (8). The darkest contour indicates the region of the highest
land prices while the lighter contours indicate progressively lower land prices.
The white contours represents undeveloped land.
In the spatial equilibria of cities with public open space, the city no longer
has a circular shape since land prices depend on the distance to the amenities
as well as the CBD. Not all the land within the city boundary is developed
since some land is public open space surrounded by development.
Suppose there is a circular amount of public open space located at (ac1;ac2).


















tance between the household location (u;v) and the closest edge of the closest
circular public open space, µ is the cost of a recreation trip for a household
living one mile away, and Ã determines the rate at which intra-city travel
costs increase the further away a household is from the amenity. Since the
cost of a recreation trip increases the further away a household is from the
open space, the attractiveness of a housing location declines the further the
home is from the open space. Note this by substituting k(u;v) = µzÃ into the
household's bid price (5). Since each circular amount of public open space
16is assumed identical, a household takes all its recreation trips to the closest
park.
The ambient amenity function is assumed to have the form a(u;v) =
1+ ad(eÁrd+¸(0:1¡rd)(1+(rd¡0:1))2 ¡ 1)(e¡´z ¢1), where z is a vector of distances
between the household location (u;v) and the closest edge of each circular
park in the city, ad is the level of ambient amenities provided to a household
located at the edge of a park, Á and ¸ determine how much the size of each
park in°uences the ambient amenity level, and ´ determines the rate at which
ambient amenity level declines the further a household is from each amenity.
Unlike bene¯ts households receive from recreation, where only the closest
public open space matters, every public open space potentially has an in°u-
ence on the ambient amenity level at location (u;v). However, only public
open space very close to (u;v) raises the ambient amenity level since a(u;v)
falls o® very quickly to the normalized value of one with distance from a pub-
lic open space. Since the ambient amenity level declines the further a home
is from open space, here is another reason that the attractiveness of housing
location dissipates with distance from open space. Note this by substituting
a(u;v) = 1 + ad(eÁrd+¸(0:1¡rd)(1+(rd¡0:1))2 ¡ 1)(e¡´z ¢ 1) into the household's
bid price (5).
3.1 Open space locations and their proximity to each
other
3.1.1 Ambient Amenities Present
Panels (b)-(d) of Figure 1 illustrate how the proximity of open spaces to
each other in°uence the urban spatial structure for the closed city model
with ambient amenities. Panel (b) shows two public open spaces opposite
each other across the CBD at (0;1) and (0;¡1). In panels (c)-(d), the open
space initially at (0;1) is brought clockwise around the city towards the open
space at (0;¡1). The open spaces are kept at the same distance from the
CBD in panels (b)-(d) to examine solely the in°uence of public open space
proximity to each other.
Figure 1 illustrates that the proximity of open spaces to each other in-
°uence the concentration of high land rents. The closer the open spaces are
to each other the greater the proportion of the city area having the darkest
shading for land rents. The reason for this is that both open spaces in°uence
the level of ambient amenities at a location. Since the locations between
17the open spaces enjoy two doses of ambient amenities, those locations are
especially attractive, and land prices increase even more there.
Another observation about Figure 1 is that the closer the open spaces
are to each other the more that the city is developed away from the CBD.
The commuting costs of the households increase the further that the house-
holds locate away from the CBD. Higher commuting costs reduce the income
available for the consumption of housing, recreation trips, and the numeraire
good.
Comparing a city with no open space in panel (a) to the cities with
open space in panels (b)-(d), the presence of open space steepens the land
rent gradient. In particular, the ambient amenities make the locations close
to the open spaces very attractive, and the land prices there are elevated
signi¯cantly above the land price at the city boundary rag. Since the locations
between the open spaces are even more attractive the closer the open spaces
are to each other, the land rent gradient is the steepest in panel (d).
Table 2 lists equilibrium features of the urban spatial structure of the
cities in Figure 1. Comparing the city with no open space to the cities with
open space in Figure 1, the equilibrium utility level is lower, the developed
area is larger, the housing density is lower, and the total land rents are
lower in the city with no open space. Since public open space increases
utility through recreation trips and ambient amenities, utility is higher in
the cities with open space. The rise in land rents that open space generates
in cities stimulates greater housing density in those cities. Since the number
of households is ¯xed in the closed city model, the greater housing density for
cities with open space reduces the developed area of those cities. In contrast,
in the open city model, the in-migration caused by the open space results in
an increase of the developed area.
To evaluate open space policies in the short-run, the closed city model
is appropriate. The open space policy of focus in this section is judging the
appropriate proximity of open spaces to each other in cities. Perhaps most
important among the equilibrium features of a city in the short-run to policy
makers is the equilibrium utility. The equilibrium utility rises then drops as
the open space above the CBD is rotated clockwise towards the open space
below the CBD. The equilibrium utility rises initially because the double
dose of ambient amenities bene¯ts households. However, as the open spaces
get very close to each other, the area between the open spaces disappears,
and the developed area of the city is drawn away from the CBD resulting in
greater commuting costs.
18As the public open spaces get closer to each other, the developed area
of the city falls, the average housing density rises, and the total land rents
rise. By bringing the open spaces together, the land surrounding the open
spaces becomes extremely attractive. Whenever a localized area is made very
attractive, high density development occurs in that area, and the developed
area of the city falls. In a city with no open space, the CBD is the most
attractive location in a city. However, for cities with open space, the land
surrounding the open spaces are the most attractive locations in the city.
The ¯rst reason the land around the open space is so attractive is because
of the choice of a high value for the parameter °. The second reason is that
the level of the ambient amenities tapers o® very quickly with distance from
the open space. Since the high level of ambient amenities is only available to
households located on a small section of land around the open space, the land
around the open space is especially attractive relative to all other locations
in the city.
Table 3 lists equilibrium features of the recreation done at the public
open spaces in Figure 1. As the public open spaces get closer to each other,
the total net bene¯ts of recreation steadily falls, but the ratio of recreation
trips to travel costs initially rises then drops. Although this result appears
puzzling, the reason that the net bene¯ts of recreation fall is that household
income less commuting costs fall since the developed area of the city is getting
further from the CBD. The ratio of recreation trips to travel costs initially
rises since more people live nearer to the public open spaces. Only the rise
in commuting costs keeps the net bene¯ts of recreation from rising. When
the open spaces are closest to each other, many households still live close
to open spaces, but the recreation trips are less since the higher commuting
costs have shrunk recreation demand signi¯cantly.
3.1.2 Ambient Amenities Absent
Panels (b)-(d) of Figure 2 illustrate how the proximity of open spaces to each
other in°uence the urban spatial structure for the closed city model without
ambient amenities. The simulations are of the same spatial con¯gurations
of public open space in Figure 1 except that the open spaces no longer o®er
ambient amenities to households.
There is much less distortion of the land rents if the open spaces do not of-
fer ambient amenities. Not until panel (c) do three contours in the land rents
gradient appear. In panel (d) the three contours are more pronounced. There
19Figure 1: Open spaces at di®erent proximities to each other for a closed city
model with ambient amenities. (a) No open space; (b) open space at (0;1)






20is no high density development around the open spaces since the recreation
trip costs do not rise dramatically with distance from the open space. The
most attractive location is the CBD, but the recreation bene¯ts do stimulate
some attraction to the open spaces raising land rents moderately around the
open spaces. Since the greater proximity of the open spaces to each other
does not make the locations around the open spaces more attractive than
the CBD, the developed area of the city shifts little away from the CBD.
Table 2 lists equilibrium features of the urban spatial structure of the
cities in Figure 3. The cities with open space in Figure 2 have higher equi-
librium utility levels, fewer developed acres, higher housing density, and the
total land rents are lower than the city with no open space. Since public
open space increases utility through recreation trips, utility is higher in cities
with open space and no ambient amenities than in cities with no open space.
Since the open space generates a steeper land rent gradient and the number
of households is ¯xed, the developed area of cities with open space falls. An-
other outcome of the steeper land rent gradient is that the average housing
density of the city rises.
The net result of land rents rising moderately and the developed area
falling is that the total land rents of those cities falls. For the cities with
ambient amenities, total land rents are higher because the ambient amenities
raise the attractiveness of the locations around the open space at no cost
to the households. Unlike recreation bene¯ts, where there is a cost of a
recreation trip leaving less income available for housing, ambient amenities
make locations nearby open space attractive at no cost.
For the simulations in Figure 2, as the public open spaces are brought
closer together, the equilibrium utility steadily drops. Since there is no double
dosage of ambient amenities the closer that the open spaces are brought to
each other, the clumping of the open spaces merely increases the travel costs
of recreation for households on the far side of the city. Higher total costs
of recreation and no ambient amenity bene¯ts results in lower equilibrium
utility in the city.
The attraction of households to the recreation bene¯ts of open spaces
makes the locations near the open spaces more attractive than the loca-
tions are when there is no open space. The rise in the number of attractive
locations for cities with open space increases the housing density, and the
developed area of the city falls. The closer the open spaces are to each other
the more that the city develops in a single direction spatially{in the direction
of the open space. If a city develops more in a single direction spatially, the
21land rent gradient steepens, and the developed area of the city falls. In other
words, the more that a small region of the landscape becomes very attractive
the more that total land rents rise, since the households bid high to live at
the top locations, and the more that the developed area of the city falls.
Table 3 lists equilibrium features of the recreation done at the public open
spaces in Figure 2. Unlike in the simulations in Figure 1, the developed area
of the city does not shift away from the CBD the closer the open spaces
get to each other. As a consequence, recreation demand (3) does not shift
downward due to the rise in commuting costs. However, the closer that the
open spaces get to each other the more that total recreation costs rise since
the travel costs per recreation trip for households at the far side of the city
increase. The result is that as the public open spaces get closer to each other
both the total net bene¯ts of recreation and the ratio of recreation trips to
travel costs steadily fall. Since households do not crowd closer to the open
spaces in the Figure 2 simulations, as the the open spaces get closer to each
other, the decline in the total net bene¯ts of recreation is faster for the Figure
2 simulations than the Figure 1 simulations.
3.2 Open space locations and their proximity to the
CBD
3.2.1 Ambient Amenities Present
Panels (a)-(f) of Figure 3 illustrate how the proximity of open spaces to the
CBD in°uence the urban spatial structure for the closed city model with
ambient amenities. Panels (a)-(d) show a public open space progressively
further from the CBD until commuting costs are so high that no develop-
ment occurs around the open space. In panels (e)-(f), there are two open
spaces. While one open space is held ¯xed at (0;¡1), the other open space is
placed progressively further from the CBD. In panels (e)-(f), both the prox-
imity of the open spaces to each other and their distance from the CBD is
changing. Since the in°uence of the proximity of open spaces to each other
was examined in the prior section, the information from that section should
allow for the identi¯cation of the separate in°uence of the distance of the
open space from the CBD.
Figure 3 illustrates that the proximity of open space to the CBD in°uences
the land rent gradient. The further the open space is from the CBD the °atter
is the land rent gradient around the open space until there is no development
22Figure 2: Open spaces at di®erent proximities to each other for a closed city
model without ambient amenities. (a) No open space; (b) open space at (0,1)






23around it. When the open space is close to the CBD, the attractiveness of the
locations around the open space far exceed the attractiveness of the CBD.
In fact, in panel (b), there is no development at all around the CBD because
of the strong attraction to the open space.
Table 2 lists equilibrium features of the urban spatial structure of the
cities in Figure 1. The open space policy of focus in this section is judging
the appropriate proximity of open spaces to the CBD. The equilibrium utility
falls the further the open space is from the CBD since households cannot
locate close to both work and to the open space.
The developed area of the cities with open space is always less the de-
veloped area of a city with no open space because the open space is such a
strong attraction that high density development is built around it. However,
the further that the open space is from the CBD the less attractive the loca-
tions around the open space become, and the more that the developed area
of the city rises. The only exception is in panel (b) where development is
only around the open space. Since the open space has a complete grasp on
the city, there is no additional development that a nearby CBD is stimulating
that would increase the developed area of the city.
The total land rents of the cities with open space far away from the CBD
are often less than the total land rents of cities with no open space. The
reason is that when the households locate near an open space far away from
the CBD to enjoy the ambient amenities of the open space there are high
commuting costs that prevent substantial payment for housing. The low bid
prices for housing result in low total land rents.
Table 3 lists equilibrium features of the recreation done at the public open
spaces in Figure 3. The further the public open space gets from the CBD
the more that the net bene¯ts of recreation fall. From panel (a) to panel (b),
the ratio of trips to travel costs barely falls, but the net bene¯ts of recreation
falls signi¯cantly. The reason is that recreation demand shifts downward
because of the rise in commuting costs, but households still live the same
distance away from the open space. In panels (c)-(d), the development near
the CBD raises the total travel costs of recreation dramatically. However, the
net bene¯ts of recreation do not fall dramatically since recreation demand
shifts upward for those households near the CBD. In panels (e)-(f), the net
bene¯ts of recreation fall even though households live closer to the open
space in panel (f) because of the downward shift in recreation demand for
the households located around the open space at (0;3).
24Figure 3: Open space at di®erent proximities to the central business district
(CBD) for a closed city model with ambient amenities. (a) open space at
(0;1) ; (b) open space at (0;3); (c) open space at (0;6); (d) open space
at (0;12); (e) open space at (0;1) and (0;¡1); (f) open space at (0;3) and
(0;¡1).
253.2.2 Ambient Amenities Absent
Panels (a)-(d) of Figure 4 illustrate how the proximity of open spaces to the
CBD in°uence the urban spatial structure for the closed city model without
ambient amenities. Panels (a)-(b) show a public open space progressively
further from the CBD until commuting costs are so high that no development
occurs around the open space. The open space does not need to be far from
the CBD before no development occurs around the open space because the
strong attraction of the ambient amenities is absent. In panels (c)-(d), there
are two open spaces. While one open space is held ¯xed at (0;¡1), the other
open space is placed progressively further from the CBD.
The land rent gradient is °at in all these simulations because there are
no ambient amenity bene¯ts. For panels (a)-(b), the further the open space
is from the CBD the °atter is the land rent gradient of the city. For panels
(c)-(d), the open spaces are initially close enough to each other, but not
too close, that the land rents are di®used. However, as the open space is
placed further from the CBD, the in°uence of the displaced open space loses
all signi¯cance, and the land rent gradient actually steepens. For all these
simulations, the attractiveness of the CBD far exceeds the attractiveness of
the locations around the open space.
Table 2 lists the equilibrium features of the urban spatial structure of the
cities in Figure 4. The equilibrium utility falls the further that open space
is from the CBD. The developed area falls the more that a small region of
the landscape is very attractive to households. In panel (b), since there are
two distinct locations of spatial attraction, the developed area is quite large.
In panel (d), there is actually only one location of attraction since the open
space far away from the CBD is completely unattractive to the households.
As a consequence, the developed area in panel (d) is less than the developed
area in panel (c).
Similar to the other simulations where ambient amenities are absent the
total land rents are lower in cities with open space than for a city with no
open space. The developed area falls because there is attraction to the open
spaces, but the bid price for housing rises very little since income is siphoned
away to recreation. The net result is a decline in the total land rents.
Table 3 lists equilibrium features of the recreation done at the public open
spaces in Figure 3. The further the public open space gets from the CBD
the more that the net bene¯ts of recreation fall. Since the CBD is the most
attractive feature of the city, there are no shifts in recreation demand since
26the developed area of the city remains around the CBD The fall in the net
bene¯ts of recreation is largely because the travel costs of recreation rise the
further the open space is from the CBD.
Figure 4: Open space at di®erent proximities to the central business district
(CBD) for a closed city model without ambient amenities. (a) open space at
(0,1) ; (b) open space at (0,3); (c) open space at (0,1) and (0,-1); (d) open
space at (0,3) and (0,-1).
4 Conclusion
This paper illustrates how di®erent locations of open space in°uence recre-
ation and urban spatial structure. There has been no prior work examining
exclusively the recreation implications of di®erent placements of open space.
First, the importance of the proximity of open spaces to each other was
27investigated. The extent that the developed area is drawn away from the
CBD and double dosages of ambient amenities were shown to be in°uential
determinants of the equilibrium utility and the net bene¯ts of recreation.
Second, the importance of the proximity of the open spaces to the CBD was
investigated. The extent to which the open spaces create a small region of at-
tractive locations near the CBD was shown to have the most dramatic e®ects
on developed area, equilibrium utility and the net bene¯ts of recreation.
Future work will include simulations of the open city model. Also, the
presence of di®erent income groups is likely to o®er an useful perspective on
how di®erent socioeconomic characteristics of the city in°uence the urban
spatial structure and recreation characteristics of a city.
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29Table 1
The values of parameters used in the simulations
Parameter Value Interpretation
° 0.5 The elasticity of utility with respect to amenities
® 0.4 Households spend four-tenths of their income after commuting costs on housing
¯ 0.05 Households spend one-twentieth of their income after commuting costs on housing
y 40000 Gross household income
t 1000 Annual commuting cost per mile (round-trip)
rag 3000 Agricultural land rent per acre
µ 2 Intra-city travel cost per mile (round-trip)
Ã 1.5 Intra-city travel cost parameter
oc 10 On-site cost per trip to an amenity
ad 0.16 Ambient amenity function parameter
rd 0.5 Radius of circular amenity
Á 2.69 Ambient amenity function parameter
¸ 0.1 Ambient amenity function parameter
´ 2 Ambient amenity function parameter
± 1.4 The ratio of housing value to non-land construction costs
c0 1000 Fixed cost prior to construction
30Table 2
Equilibrium features of closed city models with open space








No open space (Fig. 1 and Fig. 3) 3669.58 2192 759.49 7.27
Proximity of open spaces to each other
Ambient amenities present (Fig. 1)
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 5093.8 1638.79 896.43 7.32





2) and (0;¡1) 5115.24 1340.32 1021.8 7.58
Proximity of open space to the CBD
Ambient amenities present (Fig. 2)
At (0;1) 4851.39 1479.05 957.49 7.44
At (0;3) 4642.25 1468.92 930.77 7.03
At (0;6) 4337.29 1597.75 849.07 6.52
At (0;12) 4096.37 2091.42 758.35 6.91
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 5093.81 1638.79 896.43 7.32
At (0;3) and (0;¡1) 4912.91 1586.82 905.55 7.24
Proximity of open spaces to each other
Ambient amenities absent (Fig. 3)
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 4521.27 2017.91 776.28 6.96





2) and (0;¡1) 4506.61 2000.97 780.73 6.98
Proximity of open space to the CBD
Ambient amenities present (Fig. 4)
At (0;1) 4509.85 1986.56 788.29 6.97
At (0;3) 4441.73 2091.59 755.46 6.97
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 4521.27 2017.91 776.28 6.96
At (0;3) and (0;¡1) 4509.85 2014.82 777.24 6.97
31Table 3
Recreation features of closed city models with open space











No open space (Fig. 1 and Fig. 3) NA NA NA NA
Proximity of open spaces to each other
Ambient amenities present (Fig. 1)
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 16.91 382.11 78.58 4.86





2) and (0;¡1) 16.82 381.39 66.84 5.71
Proximity of open space to the CBD
Ambient amenities present (Fig. 2)
At (0;1) 16.78 377.44 107.14 3.52
At (0;3) 15.81 359.09 108.67 3.3
At (0;6) 13.83 280.67 712.27 0.39
At (0;12) 8.75 44.02 3,327.73 0.01
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 16.91 382.11 78.58 4.86
At (0;3) and (0;¡1) 16.59 376.81 72.59 5.19
Proximity of open spaces to each other
Ambient amenities absent (Fig. 3)
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 16.85 373.36 174.28 2.14





2) and (0;¡1) 16.68 358.66 319.34 1.12
Proximity of open space to the CBD
Ambient amenities absent (Fig. 4)
At (0;1) 16.65 354.5 362.71 0.97
At (0;3) 15.25 252.51 1,362.13 0.19
At (0;1) and (0;¡1) 16.85 373.36 174.28 2.14
At (0;3) and (0;¡1) 16.65 354.5 362.71 0.97
32